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We evaluate critically some of the properties of the Majority Judgement vot-
ing procedure recently proposed by Balinski and Laraki (2007a, 2007b) for
the election of one out of two or more candidates.
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1 Introduction
Arrow’s (1951, 1963) Impossibility Theorem asserts that no voting procedure
for selecting one out of three or more alternatives can satisfy simultaneously
a small number of natural desiderata. This of course does not mean that all
voting procedures are equally bad, and every once in a while one encounters
in the literature a newly proposed voting system based on a novel principle.1
As far as we know, the last two such voting systems proposed before 2007
were approval voting, due to Brams and Fishburn (1978, 1983); and voting
by veto, due to Mueller (1978), extended by Moulin (1983:138–140), and
generalized by Felsenthal and Machover (1992b).
In 2007, nearly thirty years later, a new voting procedure, called majority
judgement (MJ), was proposed by Balinski and Laraki (B&L) (2007a; 2007b).
The MJ voting procedure is designed for electing one out of n candidates
(n ≥ 2).2 As in some sport and wine-ranking contests, each voter/judge
awards each candidate/contestant a grade, measured on an ordinal scale. The
ordinal grades employed may be expressed in numerals (e.g., 1,2,3,...,100)
or in words (e.g., Reject, Poor, Acceptable, Good, Very Good, Excellent –
B&L (2007b) used these six grades in their 2007 French presidential election
experiment).
Next, the median grade of each candidate – that is, the median of the
grades awarded to the candidate – is determined. The winner is selected, by
a process described below, from among the candidates with highest median
grade.3
In case of a tie between the median grades, denoted by α, of two or
more leading candidates, B&L propose the following iterative tie-breaking
algorithm.
1. Delete one α grade from each of the tied candidates.
1This is quite apart from amendments to or elaborations of existing voting systems,
e.g., methods for dealing with the Condorcet voting system in case a top cycle occurs (cf.
Kemeny, 1959; Young, 1988; Felsenthal and Machover, 1992a).
2However, it can be adapted in a natural way for electing more than one candidate.
3If the number of voters is even and a candidate’s two middle grades are diﬀerent, then
the median is not uniquely deﬁned. B&L take the lower of the two middle grades as the
median grade. This asymmetry of the MJ procedure creates some problems, as we will
show in Examples 3.2 and 3.7 below.
12. Compute for each of the tied candidates the new value of α, the median
grade.
3. If the new α grade of one of the (previously) tied candidates is higher
than that of each of the other (previously) tied candidates, then this
candidate is the winner. If there is still a tie between two or more
candidates with the new median grade α, go to step 1.
It is not diﬃcult to see that this algorithm must terminate with one winner,
or with a dead heat between several candidates who have exactly the same
grade distributions (that is: who, for each grade, have been awarded this
grade by the same number of voters). In the latter case – which is extremely
unlikely if the electorate is large – the winner must be chosen by lottery from
among these top candidates.
This tie-breaking iterative process may get tedious due to the number of
iterations needed if there are many voters – as is the usual case in public
elections. In such cases B&L (2007b:12–13, 39–40) provide the following
‘simpliﬁed’ rule for breaking ties.
They assign to each candidate an ordered triple – called the candidate’s
majority-value – (p,α∗,q), where:
α := candidate’s median grade,
p := number of grades above α awarded to the candidate,
q := number of grades below α awarded to the candidate;
and the superscript ∗ is +, 0 or − according as p > q, p = q or p < q,
respectively.
The winner must be selected from among those whose median grade α is
maximal. To this end, one deﬁnes a total ordering  among the majority-
value triples with this maximal median α.
First, put:
(p,α
+,q)  (r,α
0,s)  (t,α
−,u) for all p,q,r,s,t and u. (1)
Next, for triples with the same middle-term superscript put:
(p,α
+,q)  (r,α
+,s) if (p > r) or (p = r and q < s), (2)
(p,α
0,q)  (r,α
0,s) if p > r, (3)
(p,α
−,q)  (r,α
−,s) if (q < s) or (q = s and p > r). (4)
Note that, by the deﬁnition of the superscript ∗, in case (2) we have p > q
and r > s; in case (3) we have p = q and r = s; and in case (4) we have
p < q and r < s.
2The winner is the candidate whose majority-value triple is maximal in this
ordering. If there are several such candidates, then presumably the winner
must be chosen by lottery from among them.
However, as we shall see in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, this simpliﬁed rule does
not always yield the same result as the iterative algorithm. For this reason,
we shall always use the latter.
The idea that a candidate with the highest median grade ought to be elected
is not novel and has been around for some time. As far as we know, it
was ﬁrst proposed in the modern social choice literature by Bassett and
Persky (1999). However, the crucial innovation of B&L (2007a) is to propose
a tie-breaking algorithm, without which it would be impossible to use the
MJ procedure in practice. Note that for an electorate of reasonable size ties
between two or more leading candidates occur very rarely under conventional
voting procedures such as plurality (‘ﬁrst past the post’), approval voting,
Borda score, and alternative vote; and hence it is reasonable in such rare
cases to break the tie by lottery. However, under a grading system it is quite
likely that several candidates will share the highest median grade, and it
would be unreasonable to break the tie between them by lottery, except in
the rare case where all their grades are the same.
As we noted at the outset, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem implies that no
voting procedure is perfect: every voting procedure satisﬁes some desiderata
but not others. The evaluation of any given voting procedure depends on the
number and importance of the desiderata that it satisﬁes, as well as on the
number, seriousness, and likelihood of occurrence of the paradoxes to which
it is vulnerable because it fails to satisfy other desiderata. Here ‘importance’
and ‘seriousness’ are of course a matter of opinion, and therefore the ﬁnal
judgement about a procedure is largely subjective.
In Section 2 we will outline several desiderata that are satisﬁed by the
MJ procedure, and in Section 3 we will outline some problems and paradoxes
aﬄicting the MJ procedure. However, no attempt will be made to outline
necessary or suﬃcient conditions for the occurrence of these paradoxes un-
der the MJ procedure, nor will we attempt to evaluate, for lack of suﬃcient
empirical data, the likelihood of these paradoxes occurring in practice. For
reasons of space we shall also not compare the MJ procedure with other vot-
ing procedures. The interested reader can ﬁnd a comprehensive comparative
analysis of voting procedures in Nurmi (1987).
32 Advantages of the MJ procedure
The MJ procedure has the following desirable properties.4
• Voter-expressivity: promoted by allowing voters to award (ordinal)
grades to all candidates.
• Anonymity: all voters are treated equally.
• Neutrality: all candidates are treated equally.
• Unanimity: if all voters award candidate x a higher grade than to every
other candidate, then x is elected.
• Transitive ordering: candidates are ranked in a transitive ordering; one
candidate is necessarily ranked ahead or behind another, unless they
have identical sets of grades.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives: if candidate x wins, then x
would still win if another candidate, y, is removed, ceteris paribus.
• Monotonicity: if candidate x wins, then x would still win if one of x’s
grades is increased, ceteris paribus.
• Immunity to candidate cloning: if candidate x wins, then x would still
win if another candidate is added with grade distribution identical to
that of x or of another candidate, ceteris paribus.
• The MJ procedure satisﬁes the resolvability criterion: the probability
of a dead heat between two or more leading candidates – requiring
lottery for choosing the ﬁnal winner – approaches zero rapidly as the
number of voters increases.
• Use of the median encourages voters to grade sincerely: in other words,
to award each candidate the grade they believe is the ‘right one’. (How-
ever, as we shall see in Example 3.3, in the competitive context of the
MJ procedure this is true only with some reservations.)
Let us also note that the MJ procedure reduces to the Approval Voting
procedure (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) if there are just two available
grades: say, ‘approve’ or ‘disapprove’. When the number of grades is greater
than two, some of the advantages of Approval Voting are shared or even
4Here and in the sequel, when we say that a candidate ‘wins’ we mean that s/he wins
outright or is one of the dead-heaters from among whom the winner is chosen by lottery.
4enhanced by the MJ procedure; but as we shall see some of the advantages
are lost.
We shall now turn to list, exemplify, and discuss the main disadvantages of
the MJ procedure so as to enable the reader to better evaluate this procedure
and reach a decision as to whether the above advantages compensate for the
disadvantages.
3 Problems aﬄicting the MJ procedure
In this section we shall use the following notation. Candidates will be denoted
by lower-case letters, x,y,z,...; voters will be labelled by italicized digits,
1,2,3,...; and grades will be denoted by upper-case letters, in increasing
order: A ≺ B ≺ C ≺ ... .
Note that although under the MJ procedure voters are not asked to rank-
order the candidates explicitly, a (weak) total ordering of the candidates is
implicit in the grades awarded them by a given voter. It can hardly be denied
– and we shall therefore assume – that a voter who awards candidate x a
higher grade than y prefers the former to the latter.5
An issue that we wish to mention here in passing is the problematic na-
ture of aggregation of grades. When (cardinal or ordinal) grades awarded
to a given candidate by diﬀerent judges are lumped together, for example in
order to determine the median grade, this presupposes that they are com-
mensurable: so that, for example, grade G awarded by judge 1 is somehow
better, denotes greater excellence and must count for more than grade F
awarded by another judge, 2. But this presupposition is not easy to justify.
However, as this issue is not peculiar to social choice, we shall set it aside and
assume for the sake of argument that aggregation of grades is meaningful.
Discrepancy in tie-breaking
Before turning to more important matters, we show that the simpliﬁed rule
and the iterative algorithm for breaking ties between candidates with max-
imal median grade (both of which were presented in the Introduction) may
5B&L (2007a:8720) claim that ‘A measure or grade is a message that has strictly
nothing to do with a utility. A judge may dislike a wine and yet give it a high grade
because of its merits; he or she may also like a wine and yet, with great satisfaction, give
it a low grade because of its demerits.’ This may apply to judges grading wines, musicians,
or sportsmen; but, it seems to us, not to voters when grading political candidates. A voter
who prefers candidate x to y will, presumably, derive greater utility from x being elected
than from y being elected, especially if the winning candidate is to serve as the voter’s
representative in some decision-making body.
5lead to diﬀerent outcomes. As far as we can tell, this may happen for two
distinct reasons.
First, a candidate’s majority-value triple, used in the simpliﬁed rule, does
not provide complete information as to the candidate’s distribution of grades:
it tells us only how many grades the candidate was awarded above his or her
median grade, and how many below the median; but it does not tell us how
these (non-median) grades are distributed. For this reason, the simpliﬁed
rule may produce an apparent dead heat, with several candidates having the
same triple, whereas in fact the iterative algorithm can tell them apart, as is
illustrated by the following example.
3.1 Example Consider two candidates with the following distributions of
grades:
x : A, A, B, B, C, D, D,
y : A, A, B, B, C, C, D.
Both candidates have the same triple, (3,B+,2); so the simpliﬁed rule cannot
tell them apart. But after four iterations of the algorithm (dropping one
median grade at a time), we get
x : A, D, D,
y : A, C, D,
which makes x the winner.
A second cause of discrepancy between the iterative algorithm and the
simpliﬁed rule seems to be the asymmetry in the deﬁnition of the median, as
illustrated by the following example.
3.2 Example Consider two candidates with the following distributions of
grades:
x : A, B, D, D,
y : B, B, C, C.
Since B&L take the median to be the lower of the two middle grades, both
candidates have median grade B. The triples of x and y are (2,B+,1) and
(2,B+,0), respectively; so according to part (2) of the simpliﬁed rule, y is
the winner. However, one iteration of the algorithm yields
x : A, D, D,
y : B, C, C,
6which makes x the winner. Note that if we were to take the higher of the
two middle grades as the median, then x would win outright, with median
grade D as against y’s median grade, C.
We shall see in Example 3.7 below that the asymmetry in the deﬁnition
of the median can aﬀect the outcome even when there are no ties.
Strategic grading
As we mentioned in Section 2, use of the median grade encourages sincere
grading. To see this, consider the following scenario. A student submits
an examination paper to a panel of several examiners and the ﬁnal grade
awarded to the paper is to be the median of the grades awarded by the
examiners. Under these circumstances, if an examiner were informed of the
grades awarded by the other examiners, s/he would have no motive to change
the grade s/he had (sincerely) awarded. This is so because if the grade
awarded by the given examiner happens to coincide with the median grade
– then s/he certainly has no motivation to change it. If the grade s/he
(sincerely) awarded turns out to be lower than the median grade then, ceteris
paribus, the median grade would not change if s/he were to award a lower
grade than the original one; and awarding a higher grade than the original
one may only increase the median grade – contrary to what s/he considers
to be the right ﬁnal grade. Similar considerations apply if it turns out that
the grade the given examiner had awarded is higher than the median grade.
So no examiner has an incentive to ‘vote’ insincerely.
However, the incentive to vote sincerely is not maintained if the stage of
grading every single student is followed by a second stage where, similar to the
situation under the MJ procedure, the student obtaining the highest median
grade is to receive some prize or be appointed to some oﬃce. As illustrated
by the following example, once such a competitive second stage is introduced
then, in accordance with Gibbard’s (1973) and Satterthwaite’s (1975) the-
orems, there may be circumstances where voters operating under the MJ
procedure with full knowledge of how the other voters are about to vote may
be motivated to vote strategically: in a manner that does not reﬂect their
sincere opinion regarding the grades some candidates really deserve.
3.3 Example Suppose three judges, 1,2 and 3, grade three students, x,y
and z, in a competitive examination, to be won by the student having the
highest median grade. Let the grades that the judges would award if acting
sincerely be as follows:
71 2 3
x : D B B
y : A D A
z : C A D
If all judges act sincerely, then z will win.
However, suppose now that the judges are aware of this distribution of
grades. Would any of them have an incentive to change the grades they
awarded to the three candidates?
Judge 3 is content with the present outcome, and has no incentive to
make any change. But judges 1 and 2, who would presumably prefer x
to win, can achieve this by acting insincerely, either separately or jointly:
judge 1 can get x to win by downgrading z from C to A; and judge 2 can
achieve this outcome by upgrading x from B to D. Moreover, even if judge 3
suspects that one or both of the other two judges may act insincerely, s/he
can do nothing to outwit them.
This simple example demonstrates that the MJ procedure is manipulable
if voters, or at least some of them, can obtain information on how other
voters intend to vote. Obtaining such information on large electorates is
generally not very diﬃcult because opinion polls are usually conducted and
published prior to public elections, from which sophisticated voters can glean
information that may allow them to see that they would be better oﬀ by
voting insincerely. In this respect the MJ procedure does not seem to have
an advantage over any other voting procedure – it is potentially manipulable
like all the rest.
Violation of reinforcement
The reinforcement axiom, due to Young (1974), requires that if several dis-
joint electorates elect the same candidate, this candidate should also be
elected, ceteris paribus, if the electorates are merged. The following example
shows that the MJ procedure violates this desideratum.
3.4 Example Suppose there are three regions, I, II, and III, in each of
which 101 voters grade each of two candidates, x and y. The following tables
show the distributions of grades. The ﬁgure next to a grade is the number
of voters awarding that grade.
Region I
x : 21A, 31B, 48C, 1D,
y : 40A, 11B, 48C, 2D;
8Region II
x : 1A, 46B, 14C, 40D,
y : 1A, 45B, 33C, 22D;
Region III
x : 40B, 20C, 41D,
y : 48B, 3C, 50D.
If the regions are merged, then the distribution of grades will be
Merged
x : 22A, 117B, 82C, 82D,
y : 41A, 104B, 84C, 74D.
In all four elections the two candidates have equal median grades, so the
tie-breaking algorithm needs to be used. The number of iterations required
are 2, 7, 2 and 13, respectively.6 We ﬁnd that y wins in each of the three
separate regions; but when the regions are merged, x wins.7
Indiﬀerence and abstention
Voters who are indiﬀerent as between all candidates may decide to abstain
from voting, or to express their indiﬀerence actively. Under the MJ procedure
these two courses of action may have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on the outcome.
3.5 Example Suppose there are two candidates x and y, and ﬁve voters.
Two of the voters are disgruntled and dislike both candidates equally. Let
us assume that if these two voters stay at home, the candidates will have the
following distribution of votes:
x : C, D, D,
y : B, E, E,
so y will win. But now suppose the two disgruntled voters decide to express
actively their equal loathing of the candidates. Then the distributions of
votes will be
x : A, A, C, D, D,
y : A, A, B, E, E,
6If in those situations addressed in Footnote 3, in which the median is not uniquely
deﬁned, we were to choose the higher of the two middle grades instead of the lower, then
the number of iterations required to break the ties would be 1, 8, 1 and 14, respectively.
7The same outcomes are obtained using the simpliﬁed rule presented in the Introduc-
tion.
9making x the winner.8
The same example can be reinterpreted to illustrate an even more bizarre
phenomenon. In an experiment conducted by B&L in 2007, they wished
to test their proposed MJ procedure in the context of the French presiden-
tial elections. Participants were asked to grade the 12 presidential candi-
dates and were informed that a voter failing to grade a candidate would
be deemed to have awarded this candidate the lowest ‘to Reject’ grade (cf.
B&L 2007b:Table 7). Presumably, some such convention is necessary be-
cause the MJ procedure requires all candidates to have the same number of
grades.
Now let us assume that the two disgruntled voters dislike candidate x but
have no view at all about y. If they abstain, then y will win. But if they
decide to participate, they will award x the lowest grade, A; and they will fail
to grade y, and so be deemed to award y the same grade, A. Consequently,
x will win. In other words, by participating in the polls, these voters deprive
the candidate of whom they have no opinion of victory, and give it to the
candidate they positively loath.
A more extreme eﬀect of abstention is a phenomenon known in the so-
cial choice literature as the no-show paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983;
Moulin 1988). It occurs if one or more voters can obtain a more desirable
outcome if they do not participate in the election than if they do and vote
sincerely. The strong version of this paradox occurs where the voters’ most
favourite candidate gets elected if they do not participate in the election, but
is not elected if they vote sincerely.
A special case of the no-show paradox is the twin paradox (Moulin 1988):
a group of voters who grade the candidates in exactly the same way obtain
a better outcome if some of them do not vote and some vote sincerely. The
following example shows that the MJ procedure is vulnerable to the twin
paradox in its strong version.
3.6 Example Consider the following election with two candidates and seven
voters:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
x : A A A D E E E
y : B B B C F F F
Here x wins. But now suppose that voters 1 and 2, both of whom awarded
the same grades as voter 3, and who prefer candidate y, abstain from voting.
8This example would also work with one disgruntled voter. We choose to use two in
order not to make the outcome depend on the asymmetry in the deﬁnition of the median.
10Then we get:
3 4 5 6 7
x : A D E E E
y : B C F F F
Thus by abstaining, voters 1 and 2 cause their favourite candidate to win.
Asymmetry of the median
The asymmetry in the deﬁnition of the median can aﬀect the outcome even
when there are no ties.
3.7 Example Consider two candidates who are graded by four judges as
follows:
1 2 3 4
x : B C F G
y : A D E F
Here y is the outright winner according to B&L. But if we were to take
the higher of the two middle grades as the median, then x would have won
outright. Moreover, x is arguably the better candidate, as judges 1,3 and
4 award x one grade higher than y, while only judge 2 awards x one grade
lower than y.
This example can be interpreted somewhat diﬀerently, to illustrate re-
versal asymmetry. Suppose that in the grading shown above the ordering
of the grades were reversed: instead of A ≺ B ≺ ... ≺ G we would have
A  B  ...  G. In that case y would still win, because the lower of x’s
and y’s two middle grades are now F and E respectively, and F ≺ E. In
other words, a complete reversal of the grades has no eﬀect on the outcome:
y wins either way!
Violation of majoritarianism
The MJ procedure is majoritarian in the rather narrow sense that when a
majority of the voters awards a grade G to a candidate, that candidate’s me-
dian grade is G. Also, the median, which plays a major role in the procedure,
is deﬁned (or at any rate deﬁnable) in terms of the majority of grades. But
it is certainly not majoritarian in the usual sense. Consider the following
extremely simple example.
113.8 Example Suppose there are three voters who award the following
grades to two candidates:
1 2 3
x : B C F
y : A D E
Here y has the higher median grade, and so wins according to the MJ pro-
cedure. But two out of the three voters grade x above y.
Of course, this is just a toy example, but it is quite easy to illustrate
the same eﬀect with a large number of voters: under the MJ procedure it is
always possible that the winning candidate is the one whom an overwhelming
majority of the voters grade below all rivals. For example, if we replace each
of voters 1 and 3 by a million clones, then y will still win according to the
MJ procedure, although 2 million voters grade x above y, as against a single
voter who does the reverse.
Also note that if we insert additional grades between A and B and be-
tween E and F, then the diﬀerence between the grades awarded by the
majority voters (1, 3 and their clones) to x and y can be made as large as
we please in favour of x. Nevertheless the MJ procedure gets y elected.
Addendum
After submitting this paper for publication, we discovered on the internet
at http://tinyurl.com/andret a blog – entitled ‘On Balinski & Laraki’s
“majority judgement” median-based range-like voting scheme’ – containing
a critique of the MJ procedure that is broadly similar to ours. We do not
know when this blog was posted on the internet; but as far as we are aware
at the time of writing this addendum (February 2009), it has not appeared
in print. Nevertheless, we thought we should acknowledge this blog here.
The blog’s author, Warren D. Smith, is an ardent advocate of a procedure
called range voting (RV). This procedure, which is actually used in several
non-public elections, requires the voter to award each candidate a (cardinal)
numerical grade out of a range of admissible grades. The winner is chosen
by lot from among the candidates whose mean grade is highest.
W.D. Smith states (correctly) that, unlike the MJ procedure, the RV
procedure satisﬁes the reinforcement axiom and is immune to the no-show
paradox (provided that abstention from grading a candidate counts as award-
ing that candidate the lowest possible mark). However, while he shows, as
we have done in Example 3.8, that the outcome under the MJ procedure
may be extremely non-majoritarian – and implies that it should therefore be
12‘dismissed from consideration as a voting system’ – he fails to note that the
same problem aﬄicts the RV procedure as well.
To see this, replace in Example 3.8 the (ordinal) grades A,B,C,D,E,F
by the (cardinal) grades 1,2,3,6,7,8, respectively. Then the mean grades of
candidates x and y are 4.333 and 4.667, respectively; so y wins in this example
according to the RV procedure as well – although an absolute majority of
the voters grade x above y.
In the absence of empirical data we are unable to tell whether, ceteris
paribus, a non-majoritarian candidate is more likely to be elected under MJ
or under RV. However, in assessing the relative desirability of RV versus MJ,
one should also remember that although RV has some advantages over MJ,
it also has some disadvantages – the main one being that RV is considerably
more prone to strategic voting than MJ.
4 Discussion
In assessing their MJ procedure B&L (2007b:36) claim that ‘it satisﬁes al-
most every criterion that has been advanced across the years to test whether
a method of voting is acceptable.’ This seems to us an overstatement: as
was shown in the previous section, the MJ procedure is susceptible to various
paradoxes, some of them quite serious.
B&L are aware of the vulnerability of the MJ procedure to most, if not all,
the paradoxes exhibited in the previous section. But they either dismiss them
as unimportant, or consider them as desirable properties. See, for example,
their discussion at B&L (2007b:25) of the reinforcement axiom (which they
call ‘winner-consistency’) and of the no-show and related paradoxes.
Voting paradoxes fall into two broad types. The ﬁrst consists of ‘what-if’
paradoxes: a hypothetical change in the input data of an election (modiﬁca-
tion of voters’ preferences or behaviour, addition or removal of a candidate
or a voter, redistricting) results in a counter-intuitive or undesirable change
in the outcome.
Paradoxes of the second type do not relate to a change in the election
input data, but occur if some such data produce counter-intuitive or unde-
sirable outcomes.
Vulnerability of the MJ procedure to ‘what-if’ paradoxes makes it open
to manipulation by voters, as in the case of insincere grading (Example 3.3)
and abstention (Examples 3.5 and 3.6); or to gerrymandering, as in the case
of violation of reinforcement (Example 3.4).
13Of these, the most serious in our view is the no-show paradox.9 As argued
by Nurmi (1999:53):
‘Vulnerability to the no-show paradox is a serious drawback in a
voting system. After all, any reasonable voter would expect that
by voting he is contributing to the possibility that his favorite
wins. The realization that the very act of communicating his
true preferences makes the outcome worse from his point of view
than it would have been had he decided not to vote at all, may be
demoralizing. It certainly undermines the very rationale of going
to the polls.’
Let us now turn to paradoxes of the second type that aﬄict the MJ procedure.
The anomalies that arise due to the slight asymmetry in the deﬁnition
of the median (Example 3.7) are, in our opinion, not of very great concern.
Although we do not oﬀer any quantitative theoretical or empirical estimate
as to the likelihood of their occurrence, it is quite clear that if the number
of voters is large, it is very improbable that the median grade of a candidate
will not be uniquely deﬁned (either initially or in the course of applying the
tie-breaking algorithm). And even if this happens, it does not necessarily
aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome, as can be seen from working out the four sets of
data in our Example 3.4.10
But the paradox illustrated in our Example 3.8 is quite another matter.
In our view it is the most serious problem aﬄicting the MJ procedure. Most
social-choice theorists as well as most ordinary members of the public would
be reluctant to favour a procedure that may fail to elect a candidate whom a
great majority of the voters grade above all rivals, and can do so even if there
is only one rival. B&L will need to produce very powerful counter-arguments
to overcome this reluctance.
A general comment may be in order here. An underlying reason for the
various voting paradoxes is that the input data of an election contain much
more information than the outcome. Thus a great deal of information must
get lost when the input is aggregated to produce the outcome. For example,
in preferential voting procedures (in which a voter is required to order the
candidates in an order of preference), when there are just three candidates
there are six possible orderings (or 13, if indiﬀerence among candidates is
9By the way, this paradox aﬄicts many voting procedures (including all Condorcet-
consistent voting procedures when there are more than three candidates and at least 25
voters), but all scoring (positional) procedures (such as plurality and Borda’s count) are
immune to it.
10See Footnote 6.
14allowed). So the electorate is partitioned into six (or 13) classes according
to preference. The relevant data are the relative size of each class in the
total electorate. This information is given by ﬁve independent numbers (or
12, if indiﬀerence is allowed). But the outcome consists of just one piece of
information: the name (or numerical label) of the winning candidate. Loss of
information is inevitable; and it is greatly exacerbated when there are more
candidates.
The MJ procedure requires an input that contains considerably more
information than the merely preferential procedures. The latter require from
a voter no more than an ordering of the candidates in order of preference.
In fact, all that is used as input is the proportion of voters that have a given
order of preference. The MJ procedure requires, and makes some use of,
more than that: a voter is asked not merely to state whether s/he prefers x
to y but for a more nuanced information. There are several diﬀerent graded
ways in which x can be preferred to y: for example, x is excellent and y is
very bad, or x is not so bad and y is not so good, etc. (The same applies,
mutatis mutandis, also to the RV procedure mentioned in the Addendum of
Section 3. In fact, this procedure requires as input even more information
than MJ, because cardinal grades are more nuanced than merely ordinal
ones!)
The strengths of the MJ procedure derive largely from the fact that it
makes use of such more nuanced information. But this is also a source of
weakness, which is revealed most starkly when there are just two candidates.
Arrow’s Theorem applies to preferential procedures and assumes that
there are at least three candidates. But these procedures can of course be
used when there are only two candidates. Arrow’s Theorem does not hold
in this exceptional case, because then preferential procedures use as input
an exceptionally small amount of information, given by a single number: the
proportion of voters who prefer the ﬁrst candidate to the second. Because of
this, no information need be lost in aggregating the input, and therefore these
procedures need not display a paradox in this case; in fact, all the commonly
used procedures elect the candidate preferred by a majority of the voters.
But the MJ procedure requires as input considerably more information
even when there are just two candidates. (And the same applies also to the
RV procedure.) Therefore some information does get lost in aggregation, and
– as we have shown in Example 3.8 – the lost information may be: which of
the two candidates is supported by a majority of the voters.
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